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NOTES
ANTITRUST-PATENTS-LICENSES-Regulation of
Patent License Royalty Rates Under
the Antitrust Laws
Neither the Constitution nor federal legislation defines a patentee's licensing rights; 1 consequently, it has devolved upon the courts
to control patent marketing practices.2 A patentee is entitled to a
limited monopoly on his invention, and proper use of this grant is
not a violation of any law regulating trade practices. Yet licensing
affords an opportunity to enlarge the scope of this monopoly, and
courts using various rationales have declared illegal different forms
of patent licensing arrangements found to be outside the protective
coverage of the patent grant.3 Until recently, however, the courts
have not dealt with the problem of whether unusually high royalty
rates or discriminatory rates may constitute unlawful extensions of the
patent monopoly. 4
Two recent cases suggest that the antitrust laws may limit such
patent licensing practices. In American Photocopy Equip. Co. v.
Rovico,5 the holder of a patent on a portion of a photocopy machine
entered into licensing agreements which called for royalties amounting to six per cent of the net retail selling price of the machine. 6
These royalties constituted twenty-four per cent of the licensees'
selling price on the patented segment of the machine, since the
licensee was not a retailer but a manufacturer and since about half of
the price of the machine could be ascribed to the non-patented portion. The United States Court for the Northern District of Illinois
granted a preliminary injunction against an alleged infringement of
the patent rights on the machine, despite a defense of patent misuse
I. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8(8), 66 Stat. 792 (1952), 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1964).
2. See 65 CoLullr. L. REv. 1256 (1965).
3. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); United States v. Masonite Corp.,
316 U.S. 265 (1942); International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131
(1936); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 902 (1959). See also Austem, Umbras and Penumbras: The Patent Grant and
Antitrust Policy, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1015 (1965); McCarthy, A Patent Licensing
Policy for Minimizing Antitrust and Misuse Risks, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 547 (1964).
4. See STAFF OF SUBCOlllM. No. 5, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84TH CONG.,
2D SESS., ANTITRusr PROBLEMS IN THE ExPLOITATION OF PATENTS (Comm. Print 1957);
Gibbons, Field Restrictions in Patent Transactions: Economic Discrimination and Restraint of Competition, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 423, 433 (1966).
5. 359 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1966), on remand, 257 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
6. 359 F.2d 745, 746 (7th Cir. 1966). Basing the royalty rate on the retail price of
the final product has been upheld as a convenient method of computation. Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950); Hazeltine Research
Inc. v. Avco Mfg. Corp., 227 F.2d 137 (7th Cir. 1955); American Optical Co. v. New
Jersey Optical Co., 58 F. Supp. 601 (D. Mass. 1944).
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based primarily on the inordinately high royalties the patentee was
charging. 7 On appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction, declaring that the stated facts 8 if proved would constitute
a violation of the antitrust laws sufficient to sustain a misuse defense. 9
The circuit court apparently concluded that when an "exorbitant and
oppressive" royalty rate is applied to a product widely used in a given
industry, the result may, in effect, amount to price fixing since the
licensees are forced to fix a minimum selling price far above the
prices which they would otherwise have charged.10 Thus, the court
indicated that a patentee may be limited in the amount he can charge
for licensing his patent. Nevertheless, on remand the district court
heard the case on its merits and granted the plaintiff-patentee a
permanent injunction; 11 the conclusions of the Seventh Circuit appear to have been ignored, as indicated by the following passage from
the district court's opinion:
We cannot assume that there exist restrictions against "unreasonably
high royalties," absent any proof of favoritism or conspiracy to fix
prices, neither of which has been inferred, much less proven herein.
Where a patentee is certainly free not to license at all, we fail to
see how competition is restrained by charging high royalties. Indeed,
such licensing, if not beyond the scope of the patent grant, should
be encouraged under anti-trust principles, as an alternative to
monopoly, which would otherwise be present. The free competitive
market place has built-in controls such as supply and demand to
limit the royalties charged by a prospective licensor. There is no
indication that further controls are justified.12
7. This defense was not based on collusive price fixing, but upon the assertion that
the high royalty in effect caused higher selling prices.
8. The patentee denied knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the defense. The Seventh Circuit held that this denial was a sham, and
thus the facts alleged in the defense stood admitted. As authority for this proposition
the court cited Harvey Aluminum v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1964). It is possible,
however, that the court was simply punishing the patentee for not answering the
defense when such information was within its knowledge.
9. The court did not specify which of the antitrust laws was violated, and, indeed,
the basis of its holding is not entirely clear. The language of the opinion would seem
to indicate that "exorbitant and oppressive" rates constitute illegal price fixing when
the practice involves the bulk of an industry. The court did not indicate, however,
whether the price fixing was horizontal or vertical, or conscious parallelism. In addition,
although the defendant alleged other antitrust violations such as discrimination and
tie-ins, the Seventh Circuit did not deal with these claims.
10. American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, 359 F.2d 745, 747 (7th Cir. 1966).
The circuit court stated:
The record before us shows that the license agreements in effect require plaintiff's licensees to fix a minimum selling price far above the price which they would
otherwise charge and that the royalty policy of plaintiff is in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States, being exorbitant and oppressive.
Ibid.
11. American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, 257 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. III. 1966).
12. Id. at 199. (Emphasis added.)
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A second case, LaPeyre v. FTC, 13 involved discriminatory royalty
rates. Defendants owned a patent on a shrimp peeling machine which
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found to be such an important
advancement that its use had become essential to successful competition in the shrimp canning industry.14 Defendants also owned a
major shrimp cannery on the Gulf Coast which competed with other
canneries in that area and with canneries on the Northwest Coast.15
Under defendants' patent licensing agreements, the royalty rate ·
charged to all canners on the Northwest Coast was twice that charged
to those on the Gulf Coast.16 The type of shrimp caught on the
Northwest Coast cost more to peel by hand than those caught on the
Gulf Coast. This cost differential would have been eliminated if all
canners had been given access to defendants' mechanical peeling
device at equal royalty rates; instead, it was perpetuated by the discriminatory licensing practices.17 As a result, the Northwest canners
lost money and some were forced to go out of business. A three
member panel of the FTC held that the discriminatory royalty rates
constituted an unfair method of competition under section 5 of the
FTC Act.18 Two members grounded their finding of a violation on
the theory that the discriminatory rates were used improperly by
defendants to protect their own interests as a shrimp canner against
competition from the Northwest canners.19 The third member, Commissioner Elman, maintained that, even absent a finding that the
patentee was using its patent to protect other of its interests against
competition, and even conceding that the rates were simply an attempt to maximize profits on the patented machine by charging all
that the market would bear,20 the discrimination in royalty rates
among competing canners was itself enough to constitute a violation
of section 5, since a lawful monopolist has a duty under that section
to conduct his business in such a way as to avoid inflicting competitive injury on a class of customers.21 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
13. LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966), affirming Grand Caillou Packing
Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1J 16,927, at 21,955, 21,972 (FTC
1964).
14. Grand Caillou Packing Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
1J 16,927, at 21,955, 21,972 (FTC 1964).
15. Id. 1J 16,927, at 21,958.
16. Id.1J 16,927, at 21,955.
17. The patentee claimed that it costs twice as much to peel Northwest shrimp by
hand as Gulf shrimp, and that the savings resulting from the use of his machine in
the Northwest (twice those of the Gulf packers) were merely being reflected in the
higher royalty rate. The FTC, however, rejected this argument, saying that it was not
clear how large a cost differential actually resulted from hand peeling. Id. ,i 16,927,
at 21,976.
18. 38 Stat. 721 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
19. Grand Caillou Packing Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
1J 16,927, at 21,955, 21,976 (FTC 1964).
20. Id.1[ 16,927, at 21,993.
21. Ibid.
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affirmed, but instead of expressly adopting either of the rationales
separately relied on by the Commissioners,22 it declared that the
same central characteristic-"the utilization of monopoly power in
one market resulting in discrimination and curtailment of competition in another"-had been relied upon by all three Commissioners
in finding a violation of section 5 and was sufficient to support the
FTC's decision.23
In both of these cases the appellate courts were concerned with
the harm that would befall licensees and consumers in the short run
as a result of the patentees' licensing practices.24 However, neither
court thoroughly analyzed the problem before it in terms of the
relationship between the patent grant and antitrust law, and consequently the decisions shed little light on the wisdom of the limitations that they imposed on a patentee's licensing rights.25 The basic
purpose of both patent and antitrust law is to promote competition.26
The antitrust laws seek to remove all artificial market restraints in
order to insure the proper working of the free enterprise economic
system.27 The patent laws are intended to promote competition in a
different way: they are designed to stimulate inventive initiative by
affording some protection to the risk capital used in the development
and exploitation of innovations.28 Thus, the patent grant can be
22. The fact that the three Commissioners did not concur in a single opinion raises
a serious question of administrative law since the majority opinion does not represent
a majority of the five member commission. On this issue the Ninth Circuit has held
that a commission cannot issue a valid order without the concurrence of a majority of
its authorized membership. Flotill Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 358 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1966).
In fact, it was this very issue which caused one circuit judge to dissent in the LaPeyre
case.
23. LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117, 121 (5th Cir. 1966).
24. See also Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 9 (D. Alaska 1965),
supplemented by 245 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alaska 1965), which involves the same facts
and patent as LaPeyre. Relying on the FTC opinion, the court held that the discriminatory royalty rates were a valid defense to an infringement suit. In the first
opinion the court ruled such practices violative of the Sherman Act, but in the supplemental opinion it held that the violation was only a misuse of the patent. The
case thus illustrates the confusion existing among the courts in the patent misuseantitrust area. See also Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 151 U.S.P.Q. 378 (W.D. Wash. 1966),
which held that the similar facts constituted a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
25. The courts seem to have taken a prima fade attitude in favor of the antitrust
considerations when dealing with patent-antitrust conflicts. See Wood, Patents, Antitrust and Prima Facie Attitudes, 50 VA. L. REv. 571 (1964).
26. See KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST POI.ICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1965); Frost, Patents and the Antitrust Laws-Thoughts on Competitive Principle and
Application to Certain Topics, 46 Cm. B. REv. 300 (1965); Stedman, Invention and
Public Policy, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 649 (1947).
27. Antitrust law enforcement seems to be primarily concerned with insuring the
existence of price competition. However, the antitrust laws are designed to protect all
types of competition including innovation, and thus viewed, the market restraint
created by the patent grant is not at odds with the antitrust law. See Frost, supra note
26, at 311; Gibbons, Price Fixing in Patent Licenses and the Antitrust Laws, 51 VA. L.
REv. 273 (1965). But cf. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942). See generally
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viewed as a lawful market restraint deemed necessary to promote
competition in the long run at the expense of some short-run market
displacements. Given this framework, it is clear that patent law and
antitrust law are not in inherent conflict.29
Furthermore, the exclusive privilege given to an inventor under
the patent laws is not the type of monopoly against which the antitrust laws are directed. As the Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he term "monopoly" connotes the giving of an exclusive privilege
for buying, selling, working, or using a thing which the public freely
enjoyed prior to the grant. Thus a monopoly takes something from
the people. An inventor deprives the public of nothing which it
enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the
community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.ao

If one assumes the existence of a product already invented, it is easy
to say that protection of that product under a patent grant will limit
competition. However, the rationale underlying the patent law is
that patent protection is a stimulus to the invention of the product in
the first place. And the value of innovation to our society should not
be underestimated. Indeed, it has been suggested that innovation is
one of the best deterrents to monopoly, since it helps to create new
industry which may displace monopolistic power.a1 In short, if the
antitrust laws are allowed to frustrate the benefits accruing from
patent grants, competition may suffer in the long run.a 2
Courts readily accept the foregoing argument when a patentee is
exploiting his invention himself. However, the idea persists that
different rules should apply when the patentee licenses his invention,
since by licensing the patentee may be able to impose additional
market restraints as conditions on the license, and thus may be able
to enlarge his limited monopoly.as Although this approach has
HOUSE COM!IUTIEE ON THE JUDICIARY, op. cit. supra note 4; Abramson, The Economic
Bases of Patent Reform, 13 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 339 (1948); Folk, The Relation of
Patents to the Antitrust Laws, 13 LAw &: CoNTE!IIP. PROB. 278 (1948).
29. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806
(1945).
30. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (footnote
omitted).
31. SCHU!IIPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALIS!ll AND DEMOCRACY (4th ed. 1965).
32. It is clear that the mechanism which we have elected to use to stimulate innovation is the patent system. However, it is possible that if this device is carried too
far, it will result in over-stimulation, thus causing a misallocation of resources. Consequently, it may be desirable to limit the amount of stimulation by curbing the rewards
associated with a patent. See generally Baxter, supra note 27.
33. It has long been recognized that extension of the limited monopoly by contract
is not protected by the patent law. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal
Film Mfg. Co., 234 U.S. 502 (1917). For general discussions on the problem of licensing,
see Baxter, supra note 27; Gibbons, Field Restrictions in Patent Transactions: Economic Discrimination and Restraint in Competition, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 423 (1966);
Gibbons, Price Fixing in Patent Licensing and the Antitrust Laws, 51 VA. L. REv.
273 (1965).
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resulted in the elimination of many undesirable practices, the courts
should not extend this reasoning to limit licensing arrangements
which do not create greater market restraints than those possible
when the patentee does not license out but instead exploits the invention by himself. In the principal cases, the licensing practices may
have served to restrain competition, but the alternatives to licensing-exclusive exploitation by the patentee and the withholding
of the invention34-are even less desirable. 35 At least, under licensing
arrangements, licensees will compete with each other during the
term of the patent. Moreover, more competitive conditions will be
assured at the time the patent expires, since there will already be a
number of established firms with expertise in the industry engaged
in active competition. Thus, it is desirable to create a legal atmosphere which does not discourage licensing.
It is clear that a patentee may maximize the profits on his invention by being the sole marketer or user of that invention instead of
permitting exploitation by licensees. In that situation the market
forces of supply and demand automatically set the limits on the
patentee's monopoly. To set further limits in the case of licensing
arrangements would clearly discourage the practice of licensing, and
there is no apparent reason for making the profit attainable through
licensing any less than that possible if the patentee fully exploits the
patent himself.86 Moreover, the use of self-exploitation as the standard would insure that the practice of licensing will be no more
detrimental to competition vis-a-vis antitrust policy than what is
already universally deemed permissible under patent law.37
This approach would seemingly provide the courts with a standard that could be applied to the problems encountered in the principal cases, and at the same time would not put courts in the position
of having to discourage licensing. However, it is also desirable to
make sure that patent licensing arrangements are free from inequitable conduct and are kept within their legitimate scope. 38 The self34. See American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902 (1959).
35. See KAYSEN &: TURNER, op. cit. supra note 26, at 168; Furth, Price-Restrictive
Patent Licenses Under the Sherman Act, 71 HARV. L. REv. 815 (1958); 8 !DEA 107
(1964-1965).
36. See Furth, supra note 35, at 838: "Every undesirable licensing arrangement is
characterized by the fact that the patentee and his licenses acquire a margin of profit
or a degree of control over their industry which is unrelated to the competitive superiority of the patent." Thus, assuming exploitation to the fullest extent possible
under existing market conditions, any profits a patentee could legally obtain through
exploitation of his invention should also be obtainable through licensing.
37. See SUBCOMMITl'EE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS &: COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE PATENT SYSTEM: !TS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
.BASIS, STUDY No. 26 7, 24 (1960).
38. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816
(1945).
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exploitation standard alone would not be sufficient to provide
adequate protection for the competitive interests that are the concern
of the antitrust laws. An additional inquiry must be made to determine whether the challenged conduct is in furtherance of the patentee's legitimate exploitation of his invention or whether it is the
means to other ends.39 Specifically, the inquiry should be directed
toward whether the market restraint created in the licensing agreement is confined to the market for the invention itself or whether it
directly introduces alien market factors into other markets, 40 as is the
case with tying arrangements. While a patentee may not, in the
short run, reap greater profits from a tying arrangement than from
marketing the patented tying product alone, such an arrangement
still has anticompetitive effects: licensees are forced to purchase tied
products and competition in the market for these products is foreclosed.41 Such practices are, of course, prohibited.42 Significantly, their
elimination does not discourage licensing of the patented tying
product, since the patentee, even without the use of a tying arrangement, could obtain the same profits through licensing as he could
through exclusive exploitation. Furthermore, it should be remembered that if the patentee could through a tying arrangement
increase his profits beyond the amount available through self-exploi39. See Wood, supra note 25, at 593.
40. See Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Wescoast Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d 653 (9th
Cir. 1965); Steiner Sales Co. v. Schwartz Sales Co., 98 F.2d 999 (10th Cir. 1938).
41. Supply and demand limit what a buyer is willing to pay for the tied products
to the same total amount he would be willing to pay for the items if sold individually.
For example, if the buyer is willing to pay only $10 for the tying product and $2 for
the tied product, then he will be willing only to pay $12 for the package. Thus, the
only way to charge more for the tied product is to decrease the price of the tying product by the same amount and vice versa. However, this may not be true in the long
run because the elimination of competitors in the tied product may also create market
power in the tied product market. Nevertheless, the reason for the tie-in is usually to
increase the total profits on the tied products through indirect price discrimination.
Even if this discrimination is legal, other adverse effects on the market require a
prohibition of the tie-in. And if the discrimination is illegal, there is additional
reason for disallowing the tie-in. However, in either event, elimination of the tie-in
should not effect the licensing policy of a patentee. If the discrimination is legal,
it may be directly applied to the licensees, and if it is illegal, the patentee would
not be able to obtain the additional profits even without the benefit of licensing.
Thus, elimination of tie-ins promotes competition and does not discourage patent
licensing.
International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936), is a classic
example of a tying arrangement. The lessees of a patented tabulating machine
were required to use the lessor's nonpatented machine cards. This condition violated
both the Sherman and Clayton Acts since it created a restraint of trade in a product
line other than that of the patent grant. For cases in which similar practices
have been held illegal, see note 3 supra. See also Bowman, Tying Arrangements and
the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Iandiorio, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Laws, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 712 (1964); 75 HARV. L. REv. 602 (1962).
42. See, e.g., International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131
(1936).
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tation, such behavior also would be prescribed under the self-exploitation standard discussed above.
Thus, licensing practices which are used to maximize profits on a
patent to the same extent as is possible under self-exploitation and
which do not introduce alien market restraints should not be proscribed. In Rovico, it appears that the licensing practices fell within
the permissible range. Logically, it is difficult to see how simply
charging a high royalty rate to licensees could result in a greater
profit to the patentee than he could obtain by marketing his invention himself; in either case profits are limited only by the law of
supply and demand. Furthermore, it cannot by claimed that charging
high royalty rates introduces an alien restraint into markets other
than that of the patented invention. Admittedly, a higher royalty rate
results in a higher price being charged by the licensee in the secondary market for the product. However, this is true regardless of the
reason for setting the high rate. 43 For example, if a patentee who
manufactures his invention responds to an increase in labor costs by
raising the royalty rates charged to licensees, the consumer price will
increase unless the licensee absorbs the royalty increment. Thus,
legal exploitation in the primary market (the market for the patented
invention) should not be condemned because of its indirect effects in
a secondary market, since such effects must have been contemplated
in permitting patenting and licensing in the first place.44 Under this
analysis, the district court in Rovico appears to have reached the
proper result in holding that there are no restrictions against the
amount which a patentee may charge a licensee absent favoritism or
conspiracy.
A contrary decision would have several adverse effects. The
benefits from lower royalty rates would at best be short-lived, since
patentees would seek to avoid the consequences of such a decision
by resorting exclusively to self-exploitation of the patent.45 The
result would be the loss of the promotional effect that licensing has
on competition. In addition, for those types of inventions which
cannot practicably by exploited exclusively by the patentee,46 the
43. If a patent is significant, the patentee may well be able to drive all competitors
in a secondary market out of business simply by exclusively exploiting his patent.
Thus, the crucial question is whether the initial market restraint is legal.
44. It has been argued that patent royalty rates should be regulated so as to minimize the indirect effect which such rates have on secondary markets and resource allocation. See Baxter, supra note 27.
45. This may not be true in the particular case if the patentee has already committed himself to licensing.
By providing an incentive to innovate, patent law recognizes the need to allow
short-run market restraints in order to foster long-run competition. These short-run
restraints may be minimized through licensing; but if royalty rates are restricted,
patentees will undoubtedly cease to license whenever possible, thus reducing this
potential for minimizing the short-run restraints.
46. Many inventions can be commercially utilized only through licensing. See 8
!DEA 107 (1964-1965).
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courts would have to determine some sort of workable standard-a
"reasonable" royalty rate. This would involve the courts in increased
litigation and would force the judges to play the role of economic
analysts. These considerations, although not articulated by the court
in Rovico, probably played an important role in its decisions not to
limit patent royalty rates.47
The discriminatory royalty rates in LaPeyre pose a much more
difficult problem. It is submitted that the court, in finding illegal
discrimination under section 5 of the FTC Act, 48 did not give proper
weight to the purposes of the patent grant. It is helpful to view the
problem of discrimination in terms of the self-exploitation standard
discussed above. Discrimination in patent royalty rates may not result
in an increase in profits, or in additional market restraints, over what
would have resulted from exclusive exploitation by the patentee,
especially when the discrimination is used only as a means to maximize profits accruing from the making, using, or selling of the patented invention; under the self-exploitation standard, such discrimination should not be held illegal. On the other hand, application of
this standard would prohibit a patentee from discriminating in
royalty rates charged to manufacturing licensees, if he could not
legally manufacture the product himself and sell it at discriminatory
prices. In LaPeyre, the patentee had another legal avenue available
by which he could have extracted profits equivalent to the amount
earned from discriminatory licenses. The invention revolutionized
the shrimp canning industry, and the patentee could have used it
to drive all his canning competitors out of that industry. In this way,
he could take full advantage of the cost savings of his invention.
Thus, since he could have legally extracted these profits anyway, he
should be permitted to obtain them through discriminatory patent
royalty rates. 49 Nevertheless, Commissioner Elman argued that a
47. The decisions in two other cases appear to be grounded on similar considerations. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964) (dictum) ("A patent empowers the
owner to exact royalties as high as he can negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly."); United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich.), affirmed, 382
U.S. 197 (1965) (per curiam) (dictum).
48. 38 Stat. 721 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). Section 5 of the act states
that "unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." This act was designed to supplement
and bolster both the Sherman and Clayton Acts, not only by condemning existing
violations of the acts, but also by stopping, in their incipiency, practices which when
full blown would constitute violations of these acts. FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953); Fashion Originators' Guild, Inc. v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941). The FTC may also have the power under § 5 to attack practices
that are not specifically made illegal under either the Sherman or Clayton Acts but
which are violative of their spirit. American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir.
1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
49. It should be noted that under this analysis most royalty-rate discrimination
will be proscribed since it would be illegal for the patentee to discriminate in the
s~Iling of h~s in:enti?n. S~ch proscrip~io?, however, probably will not significantly
discourage llcensmg smce 1t does not llm1t the profits legally obtainable from other
means. But when an invention is so critical that exclusive exploitation would result
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lawful monopolist has no right to discriminate in the royalty rates
he charges, if such discrimination inflicts competitive injury on a
large segment of the industry.50 However, it is questionable whether
the disparity in royalty rates actually constituted discrimination;
arguably, the rate differential merely took into account the dissimilar
market positions occupied by the licensees.51 Without patent licenses,
the Northwest canners would not have been able to compete in the
industry at all, and the patentee's right to refuse to license them is
undeniable. 52 Moreover, uniform royalty rates could cause injury
to the Gulf Coast canners, since aside from peeling costs the processing costs are lower on the Northwest Coast.53 Thus, it appears that
the rationale expounded by Commissioner Elman is too superficial
to strike a proper balance between the various patent and antitrust
policies that are involved. Furthermore, under the self-exploitation
standard, if profit maximization was the sole motive behind the
discrimination in LaPeyre, then the case was incorrectly decided. 54
If, however, the reason for the discrimination in LaPeyre was that
the patentee was protecting its own canning interests on the Gulf
Coast from competition from the Northwest canners, the problem
in the taking over of an entire industry, as in LaPeyre, royalty discrimination ought
not be proscribed since the patentee could legally obtain these profits through exclusive exploitation, and from the public point of view it is desirable to encourage
licensing as an alternative to exclusive exploitation.
One might argue that all patent royalty discrimination should be legal since the
patent contemplates rewards based upon the value of the invention to users rather
than upon cost to the patentee, and that the patentee should be free to charge whatever the traffic will bear. See Baxter, supra note 27 at 287. On the other hand, it has
recently been suggested that no discriminatory royalty rates should be allowed because
of their detrimental effect on resource allocation. See Baxter, supra note 27.
50. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
51. See EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION I.Aw (1959). "Equality of treatment is
taken to mean equal treatment for persons similarly situated. Where there are substantial differences of condition, inequality is thought to be appropriate; but the differences
in treatment are expected to be appropriately related to the underlying differences in
condition." Id. at 4.
52. The LaPeyre machine was patented in 1949, but the Northwest canners did
not enter the field until 1956. Without the licenses they certainly would have been
in a worse competitive position and may never have entered the industry at all.
Grand Caillou Packing Corp., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. ,r 16,927
(FTC 1964).
53. It is cheaper to catch shrimp on the Northwest Coast but more expensive to
peel them. Thus, if the royalty rates were equal, the Gulf Coast canners would be
"harmed." This may be desirable in terms of resource allocation, but this is not the
rationale used by Commissioner Elman. Moreover, such an explanation disregards the
patent grant. For an argument that discriminatory patent royalty rates should be
proscribed because of their effects on resource allocation, see Baxter, supra note 27.
54. In any event, it is clear that a per se rule against royalty rate discrimination
would be undesirable. For instance, different licensees may use the invention for
completely different purposes. Thus, if a patentee had to charge uniform rates to all
licensees, this could eliminate commercial use in a field in which the invention is of
a lesser value. For another example of justifiable differentiation, see Hanks v. Ross,
200 F. Supp. 605 (D. Md. 1961).
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is quite different: the leverage exercised through the use of the
patent would not be limited by the natural market forces which act
on the patent monopoly; rather, it would constitute an attempt to
restrict competition in a different market.55 Although the patentee's
profits on the patented invention might not be increased by this
discrimination, his competitive position vis-a-vis the other canners
will be enhanced. Assuming that the Northwest canners were charged
the maximum that the market in that region would bear, if the Gulf
canners were charged less than what their market would bear (in
order to protect them from competition from the Northwest), the
result would be an artificial market restraint and a competitive
advantage not contemplated by the patent grant. If this were not
the case, and if all canners were charged the amount that their particular market would bear,56 then, although a differential in royalty
rates between the two areas might still exist, the competitive position
of the Northwest canners would only be subject to restraints contemplated by the patent legislation-the patentee's limited monopoly power in the market for the patented invention.
The competitive harm resulting from the limited monopoly of
a patent grant is the price of our patent policy. However, the patent
laws were intended to protect only the competitive superiority of
the invention, and not the overall market power of the patentee.
Thus, efforts to obtain competitive advantages in other than the
manufacture, use, or sale of the patented invention should not be
immunized by the patent laws from attack under the antitrust laws.57
Nevertheless, discrimination which results from charging what the
market will bear is distinguishable from such efforts, since it furthers the aims of the patent policy and does not cause additional
harm to competition over that contemplated by the patent laws.
Hence, if the discrimination in LaPeyre represented an attempt by
55. Acts which are in themselves legal forfeit their protection when they become
elements of an unlawful scheme. Jerrold Electronics Corp. v. Wescoast Broadcasting
Co., 341 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1965).
56. It is possible that the royalty rate charged to the Northwest canners is above
what the market could bear and that a lower rate would bring more canners into the
industry, thus increasing profits from the licensing of the peeling machine. This
would mean that the present Northwest canners overestimated what they could
profitably pay for the machine. In any event, royalty rates which discriminate in
order to protect interests other than the patented product result in a competitive
disadvantage that would not otherwise exist.
57. Our general policies against price discrimination are to be found in the following federal statutes: Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-5
(1964); Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13(b), 2l(a) (1964);
~e~era_I Trade Commissio~ Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914~, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1964). It
1s s1gmficant that the Robinson-Patman Act applies only to sales, not leasing. However,
patent royalty rates involving favoritism or collusion may still be illegal under the
Sherman and FTC Acts. It has been suggested that Robinson-Patman standards
should be applied to the LaPeyre situation. Baxter, supra note 27, at 310.
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the patentee to protect its canning interests, the case was correctly
decided; 58 otherwise it was not.
Admittedly, as evidenced by LaPeyre, it will be difficult to determine the reasons motivating discrimination in any given case.
This problem will have to be resolved by the trier of fact on a caseby-case basis. The inquiry should focus upon such factors as the
nature of the patent, the manner in which the discrimination arose,
the conduct of the patentee in relation both to its licensees and its
prospective licensees, the additional interests of the patentee, and
the bargaining position of the licensees.59 Such an analysis will facilitate the determination of the reason for the discrimination, which
in tum should determine its legality.
It is not claimed that this type of analysis will give a clear answer
to all questions involving patent royalty rates; rather, it is claimed
that by examining the problem within the context of the purposes
of the patent grant, the courts will reach better and more consistent
results. 6°Focusing on the wrong issues can only complicate an already
confused problem and frustrate present patent policy. Any arguments that question the soundness of prevailing patent policy01
should be directed at Congress and not the courts.
58. Frost, supra note 26, at 309 suggests that this was the reason for the discrimination in LaPeyre, and that the case only stands for the proposition that this type of
discrimination is illegal. See note 24 supra.
59. See generally Wood, supra note 25.
60. The number of different grounds available for attacking the legality of royalty
rates increases the necessity for a uniform framework of analysis. The problem may
come up in the context of the Clayton Act, the Sherman Act, the FTC Act or even
as a defense of patent misuse in a patent infringement suit. See Austern, Umbras and
Penumbras: The Patent Grant and Antitrust Policy, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1015 (1965);
Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement Suits, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 76
(1962); 75 HARV. L. REv. 602 (1962).
61. See SENATE CoM11r. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 37; Abramson, supra note 28;
Hamilton&: Till, What Is a Patent?, 13 LAW 8: CONTEMP. PROB. 245 (1948).

